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Terrorism is a threat that not only jeopardizes a country's 
security, but also the survival of ASEAN as a regional 
organization, the security of peace and stability, and the 
region's overall economic possibilities. This research 
aimed to examine the implementation of Counter-
terrorism (CT) cooperation in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) from the perspective of Indonesia's defense 
diplomacy. The research method used was the qualitative 
method which is based on the combination of interviews 
and literature review regarding ASEAN’s or ARF’s 
Counter-terrorism cooperation and Indonesia’s defense 
diplomacy from the year 2015-2019. The findings 
showed that CT cooperation is less discussed in the 
mechanism of the ARF since the current focus of ARF is 
on Trafficking in Person (TIP) and threats of Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN). 
Meanwhile, from the perspective of defense diplomacy, 
Indonesia has successfully initiated ARF Statement on 
Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent 
Extremism Conducive to Terrorism (VECT) with 
Australia and New Zealand in 2019. However, it is 
undeniable that CT cooperation through the ARF 
mechanism remains difficult to achieve due to several 
obstacles, including the differences of national interests 
and legal framework, the principle of non-interference, 
and the existence of mutual distrust between participating 
countries.  
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Terrorism is a threat that not only threatens 
the security of a country, but also the 
survival of ASEAN as a regional 
organization, the security of peace and 
stability, and the overall economic 
prospects of the region (Carpenter et al., 
2016). Over the last 30 years, there have 
been several incidents in Southeast Asia 
triggered by Islamic radicalism and long-
standing violent separatist movements in 
terms of terrorism threats (Febrica, 2010). 
Southeast Asia, historically, is a region 
located at the main intersection of the 
world. It causes this region to become 
more accessible for the external powers. 
According to Singh (2007), the religious 
motives or otherwise, has caused terrorism 
in this region is always be a national 
concern. As a result, national authorities 
take a long time to deal with terrorism 
since terrorists evolved significantly. 
Several security threats led to terrorism in 
Southeast Asia including Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (GAM) or The Free Aceh 
Movement in Indonesia, Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf in 
the Philippines, and the threats posed by 
the Pattani United Liberation Organization 
(PULO) in Thailand. 
The threat of terrorism in Southeast 
Asia is increasing along with the presence 
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) and Al-Qaeda which attempt to 
build a stronger operational area in this 
region. The indication of this threat is 
proven by the appointment of Abu Sayyaf 
leader Isnilon Hapilon as the Amir or 
leader of ISIS in Southeast Asia in 2016 in 
the Philippines (Amin, 2018). Southeast 
Asia has been directly confronted by three 
generations of global terrorism. The first 
generation was Al Qaeda, which attacked 
the World Trade Center in the USA in 
2001, the second was ISIS worldwide 
jihad in 2014, and the third was the return 
of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) 
(Sembiring, 2018). It is the United Nations 
(2018)    which   reported    that   FTF   has  
received military training in Iraq and Syria 
are more likely to carry out an attack and 
support the emergence of local terrorists. 
In this case, Mitchell (2016) stated that if 
there are no coordinated national and 
international measures, transnational 
organized crime (including terrorism) will 
have potential consequences. As a result, it 
may be stated that no single country can 
deal with terrorism without international 
cooperation. 
The ARF is seen as a crucial forum for 
developing political consensus on anti-
terror strategies. ARF is laying the 
groundwork for coordinating cooperation 
so that it does not conflict with other 
ASEAN mechanisms. This may be 
observed in the process of proposing input 
at the ARF, which is supervised by 
officials who are directly responsible for 
anti-terrorism policies at the national level 
and also backed by officials from 
ministries or agencies responsible for 
counter-terrorism (CT) issues. However, 
ASEAN Counter-terrorism cooperation 
faces several challenges, including 
differences in national interests and legal 
frameworks, the principle of non-
interference, and the distrust among 
member countries (Wilujeng & Risman, 
2020).  
According to the background, this 
research attempts to examine the 
implementation of counter-terrorism 
cooperation in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) from the perspective of 
Indonesia's defense diplomacy in 2015-
2019. This article is structured in four 
parts. First, the article briefly explains the 
history of counter-terrorism in ARF. 
Second, the article discusses 
ASEAN’s/ARF’s counter-terrorism 
cooperation. Third, it covers Indonesia’s 
defense diplomacy to promote 
ASEAN’s/ARF’s counter-terrorism 
cooperation. In the final part, the article 
concludes about how effective Indonesia’s 
defense diplomacy to promote 
ASEAN’s/ARF’s             counter-terrorism  
 
 




cooperation has been implemented. 
 
METHODS  
The research method utilized in this article 
is qualitative. In supporting the analysis, 
this article combines interviews and a 
literature review. Author seeking to find 
out research substance discussed by 
understanding the signification, process, 
and connection of the unit analysis 
(Define, 2002).  
The defense diplomacy concept will be 
utilized to analyze the implementation of 
Counter-terrorism cooperation in ARF to 
reduce the hostility or tensions and to 
enhance confidence-building within 
member states. Wibisono & 
Kusumasomantri (2020) categorizes 
Counter-terrorism cooperation into police 
cooperation, judicial cooperation, 
intelligence cooperation, migration, border 
management, as well as cooperation in 
combating terrorist financing. Meanwhile, 
Laksmana (2012) categorizes defense 
diplomacy into three functions: 
confidence-building measures (CBMs), 
defense capabilities enhancement, and 
defense industrial development; each of 
which is served through various forms of 
activities. 
In ARF, defense diplomacy is 
paramount of importance to improve 
Confidence Building Measure (CBM) to 
maintain the relationship among 
participated countries. According to 
Asmoro (2017), defense diplomacy is 
expected to create a conducive strategic 
environment for Indonesia. The main 
objective of CBM is the attempt to 
cultivate good relationships with other 
countries to equalize perceptions and 
create favorable bilateral and transparent 
cooperation. It is expected that by putting 
out this effort, tensions of mutual 
suspicion and threatening each other will 
be reduced. Hence, the development of the 
military capability of a country will not be 
misinterpreted as a threat to other 
countries. 
On  the  other hand, Rolfe (2015) stated  
that defense diplomacy can foster more 
constructive and inclusive interactions if it 
prioritizes stability and security over 
military force (hard power) and political 
interests. There are at least nine benefits of 
military and civilian cooperation in 
defense diplomacy, including: 
1. Reduction in hostility or tensions 
2. Symbolic positioning by signaling a 
willingness to work with and trust 
interlocutors 
3. A more competent armed force with a 
commitment to accountability 
mechanisms 
4. Transparency in terms of capacity and 
intentions 
5. Development and reinforcement of 
good relationships with partners 
6. Changing perceptions of each other 
7. Confidence building 
8. Encouragement through incentives and 
rewards 
9. Building a domestic constituency for 
the armed forces. 
 
ASEAN’s or ARF’s Counter-terrorism 
Cooperation 
According to Omelicheva (2010), Counter-
terrorism is a combination of public and 
international policies aimed at restricting 
the activities of terrorist groups or 
individuals affiliated with terrorist 
organizations as an effort to protect the 
public from terrorist threats. As a policy, 
Counter-terrorism includes a series of 
actions such as freezing terrorist 
organization's financial assets, making 
Counter-terrorism agreements, guiding the 
use of military force in other countries' 
territories, raids on suspected terrorist 
locations, providing military and economic 
assistance to other countries that also fight 
terrorism. In a broad sense, Counter-
terrorism encompasses government 
policies, in this case not only by law 
enforcement agencies but also by defense 
institutions. 
Wibisono & Kusumasomantri (2020) 
categorizes Counter-terrorism cooperation 
into police cooperation, judicial 
 




cooperation, intelligence cooperation, 
migration, border management, as well as 
cooperation in combating terrorist 
financing. Furthermore, Multilateral 
Tabletop or Field Exercises, Voluntary 
Training Courses, Capacity-Building 
Workshops, and ARF Pilot Projects are 
examples of such activities. The ARF 
work plan brings ASEAN Counter-
terrorism (ASEAN-CT) collaboration 
closer to the Counter Violent-Extremism 
(CVE) portion of CT by empowering 
participants in disrupting terrorists' 
attempts to utilize connectivity networks 
and freedom of information to spread their 
beliefs (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2015). 
The new focus on anti-terrorism 
strategies in the ARF and the new Inter-
sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism 
and Transnational Crime will surely be a 
significant improvement to increase 
information sharing and operational 
cooperation. However, the extent of 
cooperation remains to be seen. The real 
measure of ASEAN's capability for 
cooperation is its ability to agree on the 
substantive implementation of policy and 
shared standards and to share 
responsibilities and costs in its various 
member states. As implementation costs 
may vary significantly from state to state, 
such challenges are likely to generate new 
fractures within ASEAN or simply be 
ignored for the sake of organizational 
unity. It may not be easy to maintain them 
as they meet and may contradict domestic 
and national motives, even after 
cooperative processes have been 
establishing (Chow, 2005). 
At an operational level, significant 
overlap occurred in the realms of terror 
and other fields of transnational crime, 
such as money laundering, drug, and 
human trafficking, and/or piracy. This idea 
highlighted the importance of’ 
comprehensive security as promoted by 
ASEAN in the Southeast Asian region. 
Critically, the method above did not 
necessarily indicate that the governments 
of ASEAN considered terrorism 
insignificant in comparison with other 
security threats. Rather, their shared 
reluctance to fully securitize transnational 
crime and non-military concerns, in 
general, ensured that counter-terrorism 
policies within ASEAN member states 
generally barred the deployment of armed 
forces as the exclusive means of 
combating terrorism (Tan & Nasu, 2016). 
Furthermore, ASEAN members have 
attempted to combat terrorism by a variety 
of approaches, including military 
activities, socioeconomic, ideological, and 
educational policies, and the enactment 
and enforcement of counter-terrorism 
laws. They have also attempted to increase 
counter-terrorism cooperation with 
external allies such as Australia and the 
United States. Despite the regional efforts 
outlined above to increase counter-
terrorism cooperation, Southeast Asian 
states did not treat terrorism in the same 
way (Tan & Nasu, 2016). Indonesia and 
Singapore, for example, have traditionally 
taken a non-militaristic, law enforcement 
approach to deal with the issue, whereas 
Malaysia and Thailand have relied on 
more coercive, militaristic responses. 
These countries' strategic decisions are 
undoubtedly influenced by history. 
Malaysia's experiences with armed 
communist rebellions, as well as 
Thailand's response to the separatist 
insurgency in its southern Malay-Muslim 
regions, are likely to have influenced their 
predilection for a military approach to 
terrorism threats. 
One of the most important functions of 
the ARF is that it promotes a more holistic 
approach to regional security, encouraging 
security cooperation on issues such as 
environmental degradation, weapons 
proliferation, and transnational crime 
without trampling cultural and societal 
sensitivities to the extent that global 
mechanisms frequently do. This approach, 
however, is not without difficulties and 
frustrations, in that adherence to cultural 
norms slows the pace of institution-
building and limits the nature and scope of 
 




their activities, which may appear counter-
productive to some at a time when urgent 
and drastic measures are required to 
combat genuine security threats (Ogilvie-
White, 2006). 
 
Indonesia’s Defense Diplomacy 
According to Gindarsah (2016), 
Indonesia's defense diplomacy has played 
a significant role in advancing the agenda 
of strategic hedging. At one level, 
Indonesian defense and security officials 
participate in ASEAN’s multilateral 
processes to assist institutionalize regional 
standards of behavior such as confidence 
building, non-interference, cooperative 
security, and peaceful conflict resolution. 
At another level, Indonesia has used 
bilateral defense diplomacy to improve its 
military capabilities and indigenous 
strategic industries. 
Inkiriwang (2020) noted that 
Indonesia's defense diplomacy is based on 
four motives through joint exercises 
including strategic engagement, CBMs, 
capacity building, and international 
reputation. These factors contributed to the 
development of defense diplomacy in 
Indonesia in this period. Identifying these 
motives is in addition to Gindarsah (2016) 
statement about the role of CBMs and 
military capabilities in the defense 
diplomacy in Indonesia. 
In addition, the ARF remains one of 
ASEAN's primary tools for strategic 
engagement and confidence building, both 
inside Southeast Asia and with regional 
partners although the merits of these 
arguments can be debated. The rising 
defense diplomacy of ARF to mitigate the 
potentially negative consequences of 
great-power politics is a continuation of 
the logic of ASEAN's ‘soft institutional 
balancing’ with the region's main powers. 
It is ‘soft’ because it lacks military 
alliances, and it is ‘institutional’ because it 
relies on multilateral procedures to handle 
foreign threats (Laksmana, 2012). 
 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
History of Counter-terrorism in ARF 
ARF is considered an important forum in 
developing political consensus related to 
anti-terror policies. Furthermore, ARF is 
developing the foundation for coordinating 
cooperation in order not to overlap with 
other mechanisms in ASEAN. This can be 
seen in the process of proposing input at 
the ARF which is guided by officials who 
are directly responsible for anti-terrorism 
policies at the national level and also 
supported by ministry or agency level 
officials responsible for Counter-terrorism 
(CT) aspects. The next step is the policy 
recommendations that have been proposed 
at the ARF must be reported to senior 
officials and the Minister of ARF for 
endorsement. 
ARF has 27 member countries 
consisting of all ASEAN member 
countries (Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
Philippines), 10 ASEAN Dialogue 
Partners (United States, Canada, China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, New 
Zealand, and the European Union) and 
several countries in the region such as 
Papua New Guinea, Mongolia, North 
Korea, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh, 
and Sri Lanka. 
Meanwhile, the meaning of the ARF 
establishment was the emergence of the 
phenomenon of regionalism and security 
that was built through cooperation that was 
considered capable of meeting security 
management needs in the Asia Pacific 
region in the post-cold war period. This is 
because the main purpose of multilateral 
interaction is to encourage participating 
countries not to discriminate, attack one 
another and then promote transparency and 
efforts to continuously promote peace 
issues and build peace (Acharya, 1997). 
In line with the incident of 11 
September 2001, the ARF agenda was 
dominated  by  the  issue of terrorism. This  
 
 




was reflected in the statement of the ARF 
Minister of Foreign Affairs at the meeting 
in Brunei Darussalam that there was a 
need to use all steps in investigating, 
arresting, and punishing those responsible 
for acts of terrorism and preventing further 
attacks. The ARF inter-session meeting 
dealing with the CBM issue also noted that 
there was a joint statement by the ARF 
regarding acts of terrorism as attacks on 
humanity and was completely unjustified 
legally based on any motivation. The ARF 
participating countries also stated their 
commitment to prevent and combat all 
forms of terrorism and cooperate at the 
regional level in efforts to Counter-
terrorism measures (Chandrawati, 2008). 
Furthermore, ARF also focused on the 
terrorism issue at the 9th ARF meeting in 
2002. As illustrated in ARF joint 
statement, terrorist attacks have a huge 
impact on the security environment. Thus, 
to combat international terrorism, ARF 
requires an immediate step. Referring to 
this step, the ARF decided to establish an 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-
terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM 
on CTTC) and issue ARF joint statement 
regarding measures against financing 
terrorism. In addition, ARF members also 
agreed to collaborate in Counter-terrorism 
processes, especially in the Asia Pacific 
region through legal assistance, funding 
measures from legal application 
cooperation. 
The issue of CT and transnational crime 
has indeed become a priority issue at ARF. 
This is evidenced by the firm commitment 
of ARF in establishing the mechanism of 
the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on 
Counter-terrorism and Transnational 
Crime (ARF ISM on CTTC) since the 
consensus reached in 2003 at the ARF 
Senior Official Meeting. 
Since the establishment of the ARF 
ISM on CTTC, Indonesia has always been 
the main actor in encouraging CTTC 
cooperation. This can be seen in the role of 
Indonesia as co-chair of the ARF ISM on 
CTTC in 2007-2008 with India, in 2013-
2014 with New Zealand, and in 2015-2017 
again became co-chair with India. The 
efforts made by Indonesia in addressing 
the issues discussed in the ARF ISM on 
CTTC complement efforts undertaken by 
other mechanisms in ASEAN such as the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime (AMMTC) or Senior 
Official Meeting on Transnational Crime 
(SOMTC) and the ASEAN Defense 
Ministerial Meeting (ADMM)/ADMM-
Plus (Sekretariat Nasional ASEAN, 2019). 
 
ASEAN’s or ARF’s Counter-terrorism 
Cooperation  
According to Sembiring (2018), Southeast 
Asia currently is faced with the third 
generation of terrorism which is proven by 
the return of foreign terrorist fighters all 
over the world. The data of FTF spreading 
in Southeast Asia and South Asia can be 
seen in Table 2. 
From the data shown, it can be seen that in 
2017, there were 671 Indonesians who 
traveled to Syria and Iraq, including 208 
women and children. In addition, 84 
fighters returned from Syria and Iraq, 
while 66 were prevented from departing 
Indonesia. Finally, Turkey has prevented 
679 people (approximately 40% of women 
and children) from continuing their travel. 
Given this fact, it is apparent that 
Indonesia has a large number of FTFs. 
Given the quick growth of terrorism, this 
can likely pose a threat to the security of 
other Southeast Asian countries. As a 
result, comprehensive cooperation is 
required to control the spread of terrorism. 
According to Wibisono & 
Kusumasomantri (2020), capacity-building 
is another milestone that ASEAN-centered 
extra-regional cooperation has achieved in 
the field of Counter-terrorism. A variety of 
joint training and tabletop exercises are 
held between forces, not just for CT 
capacity building but also for humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief initiatives. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has 
created an Inter-sessional Support Group 
to   address   challenges   such   as   marine  
 




Table 1. ARF ISM on CTTC Meetings 2003-2018 
No ARF Meetings Location Date 
1 1st Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Karambunai 21-22 March 
2003 
2 2nd Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Manila 30-31 March 
2004 
3 3rd Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Bangkok 6-8 
April 2005 
4 4th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Beijing 26-28 April 
2006 
5 5th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Singapore 2-4 
May 2007 
6 6th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Semarang 21-22 February 
2008 
7 7th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Ha Noi 4-7 
May 2009 
8 8th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 





9 9th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Kuala Lumpur 29-31 May 
2011 
10 10th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Quang Nam 16-17 Maret 
2012 
11 11th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Ha Noi 4-5 March 
2013 
12 12th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Bali 14-16 April 
2014 
13 13th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Nanning 14-15 May 
2015 
14 14th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Siem Reap 21-22 March 
2016 
15 15th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Semarang 6-7 
April 2017 
16 16th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) 
Bali 21-22 March 
2019 
Source: ASEAN Regional Forum (2018) 
 
Table 2. Estimated number of the movement and interception of Foreign Terrorist Fighter Since 2012 
(Figures from member countries, per October 2017) 
 Traveled to and 


















Bangladesh 40 a b b b b 
Indonesia 671 31% (208) 84 66 639 
Malaysia 95 30% (29) 8 b 265 
Maldives 49d b 0 47 5 
Philippines 4e b b b b 
Source: United Nation (2018) 
 
security (disaster relief), humanitarian 
assistance, transnational crime, and 
terrorism. Meanwhile, the ASEAN 
Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) 
Plus conducted a table-top exercise in 
2012 and a CT exercise in 2013. 
Another point is that ASEAN Regional 
Forum also performs as a hub for 
 




establishing a Work Plan to implement the 
PoA for 2013-2017 in 2014; it issued the 
ARF Work Plan on Counter-terrorism and 
Transnational Crime focusing on priority 
areas of cyber security, illicit drugs 
suppression, mitigation of the use of 
chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) by subversive actors, 
counter-radicalization or alternative 
narratives against extremist ideologies; 
anti-terrorism financing; and involuntary 
trafficking of persons. ARF has also 
supported wider non-traditional security 
exercises which both improve capability 
and build trust between participating 
countries (Wibisono & Kusumasomantri, 
2020). 
Although ARF ISM on CTTC has been 
established since 2003, the CT issue 
nowadays is less concerned due to a very 
broad focus of ARF discussion. Based on 
ARF Work Plan for CTTC 2019-2021, 
there are four priority areas of cooperation 
carried out at ARF, including (1) Illicit 
Drugs, (2) Chemical, Biological 
Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN), (3) 
Preventing and Countering Violent 
Extremism (PCVE), and (4) Trafficking in 
Persons (TIP). ARF currently is more 
focused on the issue of Trafficking in 
Person (TIP) and Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN). 
From all the ARF priority areas, PCVE 
becomes one of the efforts adopted by 
ARF in dealing with terrorism. In this 
cooperation, ARF member states can 
explore collaborative identification 
programs and countering the spread of 
terrorism through different platforms such 
as the internet and social media, religious 
centers, schools, including institutions of 
higher education, communities, 
organizations social and sports, as well as 
inmates in detention centers and the 
violent extremists abroad (ASEAN 
Regional Forum, 2019c). 
In the realm of achieving 
comprehensive cooperation, ARF 
Statement on Preventing and Countering 
Terrorism and Violent Extremism 
emphasizes that terrorism can only be 
defeated by a sustainable and 
comprehensive approach that involves 
active participation and collaboration of all 
countries, international and regional 
organizations in forming partnerships with 
civil society and private sector. In 
addition, appropriate actions are 
necessitated to prevent, inhibit, destroy, 
isolate, and weaken the terrorist threat and 
recognize the main role and responsibility 
of the state and certain institutions to 
prevent and Counter-terrorism the local, 
national, regional, and international level 
(ASEAN Regional Forum, 2019b). 
 
Indonesia Defense Diplomacy to 
Promote ASEAN’s or ARF’s Counter-
terrorism Cooperation 
Diplomacy that has been carried out by 
Indonesia in CTTC ARF cooperation, 
among others: (1) Indonesia proposes the 
need to develop the scope of cooperation 
in the CTTC field by considering the 
dynamics and complexity of the practice 
of crime and terrorism, especially 
regarding the need to start dialogue and 
cooperation in combating trafficking crime 
in Person (TIP); (2) Indonesia also 
expressed concern over the Foreign 
Terrorist Fighter (FTF) and the use of ICT 
for terrorism purposes, including in 
recruiting ISIS. In this case, Indonesia 
proposes that the ARF establish a long-
term special task force for handling the 
case (Directorate General of ASEAN 
Cooperation, 2015). 
Based on Inkiriwang’s (2020) research, 
it can be noted that Indonesia's defense 
diplomacy relies on four motives through 
joint exercises including strategic 
engagement, CBMs, capacity building, and 
international reputation. First, Indonesia 
has increased its defense diplomacy as it is 
useful in facilitating a strategic 
engagement of the country with large 
powers or other major international 
partners based on its Strategic Engagement 
Motif. By conducting Multilateral Naval 
Exercise Komodo (MNEK), it is proved 
 




that the multilateral exercise is crucial for 
Indonesia’s strategic engagement not only 
with the major power countries but also 
with other international partners, 
especially with the attendance of more 
than thirty countries in the region 
(Inkiriwang, 2021). Second, in 
Confidence-Building Measure (CBM) 
Motive, despite the different nationalities, 
the MNEK fosters effective interactions 
amongst participating military personnel. 
These encounters contribute to the 
development of trust, which becomes the 
focus of CBMs. Third, in Capacity-
Building Motive, The MNEK can train 
alongside other militaries to carry out 
humanitarian aid, disaster relief, asylum-
seeking, transnational crime, piracy, and 
armed robbery at sea activities. Finally, 
The MNEK has promoted Indonesian 
culture and tourism through various 
venues, and it has also allowed foreign 
forces to observe the capabilities of the 
TNI. Furthermore, the growing number of 
participants in the MNEK demonstrates 
that this exercise is recognized as an 
important defense diplomacy activity. 
 
Effectiveness of Indonesia’s Defense 
Diplomacy to Promote ASEAN’s/ARF’s 
Counter-terrorism Cooperation 
In the implementation stage, one of the 
proofs of the success of Indonesian 
diplomacy in ARF was the adoption of the 
ARF Statement on Preventing and 
Countering Terrorism and Violent 
Extremism Conducive to Terrorism 
(VECT) on August 2nd, 2019. This 
statement was an initiative initiated by 
Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. 
The important point emphasized in this 
statement is that terrorism is one of the 
most serious threats to international peace 
and security, in all its forms and 
manifestations. Any act of terrorism is 
criminal and cannot be justified regardless 
of their motivation, anytime, anywhere, 
and by anyone. 
ARF is committed and determined to 
contribute further in increasing the 
effectiveness of the overall effort to 
combat terrorism at the global level. In 
addition, ARF also considers the scale and 
complexity of terrorist threats faced by the 
Asia-Pacific region which continues to 
grow with the returnee of Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters. 
The main challenge in CT cooperation 
in ARF is the reluctance of participating 
countries to share strategic information 
due to the different interests. According to 
Weng (personal communication, 
November 28, 2019): 
The main obstacles of Counter-terrorism 
cooperation in ASEAN are: first, the level 
of trust (or more accurately, mistrust) 
amongst the member states. Second, the 
differences in national agendas between 
member states. At least between 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, there 
is a lot of common ground in terms of our 
respective national security agendas, and 
the threat that terrorist groups pose 
thereafter. But their tensions between 
Malaysia and the Philippines (think of the 
recent incident in Sabah, for instance), and 
this constitutes a potential obstacle to 
closer Counter-terrorism cooperation 
between those two states. 
 
This opinion is related to Acharya & 
Acharya (2010)  which found that the 
different perceptions of Southeast Asia 
countries in responding to the threat of 
terrorism are influenced by national 
constraints and how countries correlate 
terrorism with political-security issues. 
For instance, it can be seen that 
Indonesia is less interested in cooperating 
with the United States since “the global 
war on terror” means a global war on 
Islam. For Indonesia, terrorism is not 
merely related to Islam but is very closely 
related to the dynamics of domestic 
politics. Meanwhile, for Malaysia, 
transnational terrorism originated from 
Western countries which intend to against 
the global Muslim community.  There is 
an ambivalent perception about American 
policy that is considered as anti-Islamic 
and oppressing Muslims throughout the 
world (Acharya & Acharya, 2010). 
 




Furthermore, since Singapore relies 
heavily on the trade and tourism sectors, 
the threat of terrorism can be a major 
disaster for its economy. Therefore, 
Singapore is openly allied with western 
countries especially the United States not 
only in the business sector but also in the 
security sector and other strategic issues 
(Acharya & Acharya, 2010). 
Consequently, the sensitive issue of 
sovereignty has made some countries 
reluctant to allow the presence of foreign 
countries in conducting Counter-terrorism 
cooperation. 
Apart from these different interests, 
ASEAN member countries have the same 
spirits in condemning acts of terrorism. 
Based on data from the 2018 Global 
Terrorism Index, the Philippines and 
Myanmar are the countries in the 
Southeast Asia region with the highest 
number of deaths in 2017, and the 
Philippines ranks 10th in the world as a 
country affected by high terrorism 
(ASEAN Regional Forum, 2019a). 
Meanwhile, Steckman (2015) in her 
study of “Myanmar in the Crossroads: The 
Shadow of Jihadist Extremism”, 
highlighted that militant jihadists are still 
common in Myanmar instead of its history 
of communal conflict between nationalist 
groups and right-wing Buddhist groups 
resulting in Myanmar having to remain 
vigilant with the threat of terrorism in its 
country. Unlike Cambodia, Vietnam, and 
Laos, these countries have not been faced 
with the threat of terrorism directed at this 
time. But that does not mean terrorism is 
not possible to appear in these countries. 
The countries that have been considered as 
safe countries are possible to become the 
next targets for terrorists. This can be seen 
in the case of New Zealand which 
categorizes as one of the safe countries. In 
this case, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos 
might be the same as New Zealand. When 
other ASEAN member states increasingly 
enhance the security of their country, 
terrorists will automatically utilize those 
countries that are considered safe countries 
to be transit countries for terrorists before 
continuing their travel to the Middle East. 
Nevertheless, the Cambodian 
government has undertaken various 
significant steps, one of which is by 
working with partner countries in making 
counter-radicalization initiatives such as 
seminars and other educational programs. 
Likewise with Laos and Vietnam have also 
deepened and expanded cooperative 
relations with all friendly countries both at 
regional and international levels to 
increase mutual understanding and 
increase trust (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). 
Based on these explanations, it can be 
concluded that one of the factors driving 
the implementation of CT cooperation is 
the existence of the same interests of each 





According to the foregoing explanation, it 
can be concluded that the effectiveness of 
CT cooperation in the ARF becomes 
difficult to achieve since there are several 
obstacles including the differences of 
national interests and legal framework, the 
principle of non-interference, and the 
existence of mutual distrust between 
participating countries. In this case, to 
manage these different interests a 
hegemonic power is needed to impose 
certain norms and provide capital and 
impose cooperation based on cost and 
benefit considerations with partner 
countries.  
Furthermore, in the realm of achieving 
comprehensive cooperation, terrorism can 
only be defeated by involving active 
participation and collaboration of all 
countries, including international and 
regional organizations in forming 
partnerships with civil society and the 
private sector. Apart from the different 
interests, ASEAN member countries have 
the same goals in condemning acts of 
terrorism. However, the CT issue is 
currently less discussed in ARF due to the 
 




broad range of the ARF discussion, which 
is more focused on Trafficking in Person 
(TIP) crimes and Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear threats (CBRN). 
Meanwhile, from the perspective of 
Indonesia's defense diplomacy, Indonesia 
has successfully initiated ARF Statement 
on Preventing and Countering Terrorism 
and Violent Extremism Conducive to 
Terrorism (VECT) with Australia and New 
Zealand in 2019. It is proven that 
Indonesia's defense diplomacy has 
successfully adopted ARF CT cooperation. 
In addition, steps that can be taken are 
increasing the long-term bilateral 
cooperation in terms of information 
exchange and improving capacity building. 
This is since terrorism is constantly 




Acharya, A. (1997). Multilateralism: is 





Acharya, A., & Acharya, A. (2010). The 
Myth of the Second Front: 
Localizing the ‘War on Terror’ in 
Southeast Asia. The Washington 
Quarterly, 30(4), 75–90. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/WASH.2007.
30.4.75 
Amin, K. (2018). ISIS Menuju Asia 
Tenggara: Ancaman dan Kerja Sama 
Keamanan Kawasan dalam 
Menghadapi Peningkatan Ekspansi 
ISIS. Jurnal Hubungan 
Internasional, 6(2), 221–232. 
https://doi.org/10.18196/HI.62117 
Asean Regional Forum. (2015). ASEAN 
Regional Forum Work Plan for 
Counter Terrorism and 
Transnational Crime. 
Asean Regional Forum. (2018). ASEAN 
Regional Forum List of Track 1 
Activities. 
Asean Regional Forum. (2019a). ARF 
Annual Security Outlook. 
Asean Regional Forum. (2019b). ARF 
Statement on Preventing and 
Countering Terrorism. 
Asean Regional Forum. (2019c). ARF 
Workplan for CTTC 2019-2021. 
ASEAN Secretariat. (2015). ASEAN 
Security Outlook. 
Asmoro, N. (2017). Diplomasi Pertahanan 
dan Eksistensi Negara. 66, 50. 
Carpenter, W. M., Wiencek, D. G., & 
Lilley, J. R. (2016). Brunei: 
Multifaceted Survival Strategies of a 




Chandrawati, N. (2008). ASEAN regional 
forum dan kontribusinya terhadap 
ketahanan nasional Indonesia di 
bidang pertahanan dan keamanan 
periode 1994-2006. Program 
Pascasarjana Universitas Indonesia. 
Chow, J. T. (2005). ASEAN 
Counterterrorism Cooperation since 
9/11. Asian Survey, 45(2), 302–321. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/AS.2005.45.
2.302 
Define, F. (2002). Qualitative Analysis. In 
Theory and Methods in Political 
Science (pp. 197–215). Polgrave. 
Directorate General of ASEAN 
Cooperation. (2015). Performance 
Report. Kementerian Luar Negeri 
Republik Indonesia. 
Febrica, S. (2010). Securitizing terrorism 
in southeast asia accounting for the 
varying responses of Singapore and 




Gindarsah, I. (2016). Strategic Hedging in 
Indonesia’s Defense Diplomacy. 




Inkiriwang, F. W. (2020). ‘Garuda shield’ 
vs ‘sharp knife’: operationalising 
 








Inkiriwang, F. W. (2021). Multilateral 
Naval Exercise Komodo: Enhancing 
Indonesia’s Multilateral Defence 
Diplomacy?: Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103421
1008905 
Laksmana, E. A. (2012). Regional order 
by other means? examining the rise 
of defense diplomacy in southeast 
Asia. Asian Security, 8(3), 251–270. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.20
12.723920 
Mitchell, J. N. (2016). Transnational 
Organised Crime in Indonesia: The 
Need for International Cooperation. 




Ogilvie-White, T. (2006). Non-
proliferation and Counter-terrorism 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia: 
Meeting Global Obligations through 
Regional Security Architectures. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28(1). 
Omelicheva, M. Y. (2010). 
Counterterrorism policies in central 
Asia. Counterterrorism Policies in 
Central Asia, 1–177. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203844
946 
Rolfe, J. (2015). Regional Defence 
Diplomacy: What is it and What are 
its Limits? CSS Strategic 
Background Paper, 21(1). 
Sekretariat Nasional ASEAN. (2019). 16th 
ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting On 
Counter-Terrorism And 
Transnational Crime. 
Sembiring, E. K. J. (2018). Beri Kuliah 
Umum di Singapura, Menhan 
Ryamizard Paparkan Hal Ini. 
Singh, B. (2007). The Talibanization of 
Southeast Asia: losing the war on 
terror to Islamist extremists. 229. 
Steckman, L. (2015). Myanmar at the 
Crossroads: The Shadow of Jihadist 
Extremism. Counter Terrorist 
Trends and Analyses, 7(4), 10-16. 
Tan, S. S., & Nasu, H. (2016). ASEAN and 
the Development of Counter-
Terrorism Law and Policy in 
Southeast Asia – UNSW Law 
Journal. 
United Nation. (2018). Investigation, 
Prosecution and Adjudication of 
Foreign Terrorist Fighter Cases for 
South and South-East Asia. United 
Nation Office at Vienna. 
Wibisono, A. A., & Kusumasomantri, A. 
R. (2020). Assessing the 
Expectations and Limitations of 
ASEAN-EU Counter-Terrorism 
Cooperation. JAS (Journal of 
ASEAN Studies), 8(1), 61–80. 
https://doi.org/10.21512/JAS.V8I1.6
171 
Wilujeng, N. F., & Risman, H. (2020). 
Examining Asean Our Eyes Dealing 
with Regional Context in Counter 
Terrorism, Radicalism, and Violent 
Extremism. People: International 
Journal of Social Sciences, 6(1), 
267–281. 
https://doi.org/10.20319/PIJSS.2020.
61.267281 
 
 
 
 
 
